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ABSTRACT 
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
managed care companies who offer prescription drug benefits to 
people in the united States in recent years. These companies 
often either mandate or encourage their members to accept 
generic medication when it is available. Although consumer 
opinions of generic drugs were studied by several groups right 
after the 1989 Food and Drug Administration scandal, little 
information is available to understand current consumer 
attitudes. 
For this study, a questionnaire was mailed to 889 members 
of a national Preferred Provider Organization with 
prescription drug coverage. The information requested on the 
survey included demographics, general opinions of generic 
medications, opinions of the role pharmacists play in giving 
information and recommendations on generics, what financial 
incentives would be necessary for people to choose a generic 
medication, and consumer awareness of the generic drug scandal 
of 1989. 
The usable response rate was 31% (275/889). Of the 275 
respondents, 120 (43%) believed that generic medications were 
as effective as the brand name medications and 87 (32%) were 
neutral. Seventy-two percent of respondents considered their 
pharmacist a valuable source of information about generics. 
One hundred thirty respondents (53%) would need to save 
five dollars or more to choose a generic medication over a 
brand name. When asked if they were aware of any publicity 
surrounding the generic drug industry in recent years, 132 
respondents (48%) indicated that they were aware. Of these 
respo~dents, however, 76 people (58%) were either neutral or 
disagreed that the publicity they heard decreased their faith 
in generic medication. 
In reviewing the results it appears that many consumers 
had forgotten the publicity about the generic drug scandal 
between the time it occurred in 1989 and the time they 
completed the survey in 1991 or they were never aware of the 
scandal. Apparently people have a significant trust in their 
pharmacist and are influenced by what their pharmacist says 
regarding generic medication. Managed care companies who want 
their members to select generic medication need to structure 
their prescription drug co-payments so that members save a 
minimum of five dollars when a generic is available. Overall, 
consumers appear trusting of both generic medication and their 
pharmacist's opinion regarding drug product selection. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
since the mid 1970s, when legislatures began repealing 
antisubstitution laws in each of the states, generic 
medications have taken a larger share of the prescription 
drug market. Managed care operations, which now represent a 
large segment of the health care market, have either 
encou~aged or mandated the use of generic medication. Perri 
and colleagues reported that there has been a reluctance on 
the part of some consumers to use generic medications 
because of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
generic drug industry scandal of 1989. 1 This scenario may 
be placing the pharmacist in a difficult situation between 
health care programs that demand generic medications and 
those patients who do not feel comfortable using them. 
A review of the medical literature regarding generic 
medication over the past 15 years indicates a continuing 
controversy over this issue. 2 ,3 Physicians have stated 
concerns over the possibility that the same medication from 
different manufacturers could cause different therapeutic 
responses in the patient. Other health care professionals 
respond that there have been no broad based reports of such 
problems. One important concern has always been the 
government's ability to function as a watchdog over the 
pharmaceutical industry. The generic drug scandal of 1989 
2 
and related publicity about the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) only served to further complicate the matter. 
Studies that examined consumer attitudes of generic 
medications before the 1989 scandal showed conflicting 
opinions. Some researchers reported support for generic 
drugs, while others noted consumer skepticism. 4 Following 
the 1989 scandal there appeared to be a decline in consumer 
acceptance of generics and a fairly high awareness of FDA 
problems. 5 
Now that two years have elapsed and more recent reports 
have publicized improvements at the FDA and safety with 
generic drugs, there is confusion over current consumer 
attitudes. The number of health care programs that require 
generics to be substituted for brand name medications is 
increasing. It is imperative that the pharmacy community 
understands how consumers feel about generic medication, 
whether their attitude regarding generics was influenced by 
the generic drug scandal of 1989, and if consumers can be 
influenced by their pharmacist to accept generic 
medications. 
Statement of the Problem 
Prescription drug costs have been at the forefront of 
inflationary health care concerns in recent years. One of 
the solutions has been for managed care companies to 
encourage patients to use generic medications instead of 
brand names (those medications made by the innovator company 
3 
and which can cost considerably more money.) In fact, many 
plans mandate that generic medications must be dispensed. 
The generic drug scandal of 1989 complicated the situation 
because some consumers were apparently concerned about the 
quality and effectiveness of generic products. The 
pharmacist must adhere to third party program regulations in 
order to get paid for the prescriptions they fill, but they 
must also deal with the patient who might be reluctant to 
accept the substituted medication. 
Objectives of this study 
Given the lack of information about current consumer 
knowledge of the generic drug scandal of 1989 and attitudes 
about generic medications, this study will examine the 
following issues: general attitudes of patients toward 
generic medications; the role the pharmacist plays in 
disseminating information to patients regarding generics and 
how that information is received; consumer attitudes about 
specific drug categories to determine whether opinions about 
generics are absolute or dependent upon the specific 
prescription or condition for which the medication is being 
used; and what kind of financial incentive consumers need to 
choose a generic medication over a brand name. 
4 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the past 15 years generic medications have taken a 
larger share of the total prescription drug market in the 
united States. 1 Some people in this country have enjoyed 
lower prescription costs by accepting the generic version of 
the m~dication they take. 2 Many managed care operators and 
health insurance companies have either offered incentive 
programs that encourage the use of generics or have 
mandated their use altogether. Because more people each 
year have prescription drug benefits which encourage the use 
of generic medications, there is a potential conflict 
between the patient who wants a brand name medication and 
the pharmacist, who is trying to abide by program 
regulations. To understand consumers' attitudes regarding 
generics, a review of some of the historical, legislative, 
and clinical issues regarding prescription medication is 
necessary. 
Early Federal Legislation 
The legislative history of drug law in the united 
States greatly influenced the development of the generic 
drug industry. As early as 1831, federal statutes authorized 
the New York College of Pharmacy to supervise and regulate 
6 
the importation of drugs into this country_ An 1848 federal 
law required examination of drugs and medicinal preparations 
in an attempt to prevent contaminated products from coming 
into the united states. 3 From 1848 through the end of the 
century, no other federal law regulated the manufacture, 
prescribing, or dispensing of medications. Although many 
bills were introduced in Congress between 1880 and 1906, 
none made it through the legislative process. Economic and 
regulatory conditions during this time favored small 
companies in the food and drug industries. 3 Because of 
this, small companies proliferated in wide geographic areas. 
The larger and more established companies had no advantage 
in terms of distribution because of high transportation 
costs and other factors. Antirebate and antitrust 
legislation also favored small companies. Even foreign 
companies had advantages which compromised large scale 
producers of food and medicines in the United states. All 
of these factors lead to a very competitive drug market 
where some operators cut corners in quality and safety to 
create better profit margins. Because of the large number 
of small companies that were spread out over a large 
geographic area, the government had a difficult time 
overseeing all of the operations. 
Government agencies were receiving large numbers of 
complaints with regard to foods and medications that had 
poor quality or simply did not work. Advertising of the 
7 
early 1900s appealed to the emotional needs of Americans and 
implied products were of the highest quality and 
wholesomeness. The public was soon to hear of the abuse of 
confidences in which many of these companies were involved. 
Although the government had heard reports of problems 
with purity in the food and drug market for years, it was 
not until 1906 that conditions became so publicly deplorable 
that regulation was inevitable. Harvey Wiley, Chief Chemist 
of the Department of Agriculture, had been reporting 
concerns about preservatives, additives, and contaminants in 
foods and drugs since 1880. In 1902 he stunned many readers 
with a series entitled "The Poison Squad" which correlated 
contaminants with "sickliness and unattractiveness. ,,3 
Finally, in December of 1905, President Theodore 
Roosevelt asked Congress to pass legislation to protect the 
American people from adulterated food, beverages, and 
medications. The Senate passed their version on February 
21, 1906, and the House answered with their own on June 
23rd. 3 By June 30th, only seven days later, the President 
had signed the compromise bill, which went into effect on 
January 1, 1907. The federal government had taken the 
first real step to regulate the drug industry in the United 
states by enacting the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. This 
act allowed the government to seize any mislabeled or 
adulterated medication. 3 
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The Food, Drug, and cosmetic Act of 1938 
Although the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
accomplished a great deal in terms of protecting the public 
against contaminated medicinal products, there was no 
federal regulation regarding the active medicinal 
ingredients or the chemical bases which held them. This 
weakness was particularly important because advertising for 
medication was aimed almost exclusively at the consumer 
instead of the physician. Because nonnarcotic medication 
could be purchased without a prescription, consumers could 
choose medications themselves or ask their pharmacist for a 
recommendation. Five percent of the medication manufactured 
during this time was sold to the public by physicians and 
another 25% was sold through a pharmacy by prescription. 4 
This left 70% of the medication to be purchased by consumer 
choice. 
Sales of medicine in drug stores increased 600% in the 
20 years between 1906 and 1926, mainly because of 
successful large scale advertising by manufacturers to the 
consumer.4 Companies could essentially make whatever claims 
they desired about their products with little concern for 
government intervention. There was no federal statute that 
demanded that a company establish records of safety and 
efficacy for their products. The regulations of the early 
1900s provided only some assurances that labeled ingredients 
matched actual product. 
An incident occurred in 1938 that prompted additional 
legislation to better protect the public interest. A 
chemist who was working for the drug company, Massengill, 
was manufacturing sulfanilamide elixir. Instead of using 
the approved solvent, polypropylene glycol, he used 
diethylene glycol, which is better known as radiator 
antifreeze. The untested solvent was lethal and 107 
children died before the problem was discovered. 5 The 
American public was outraged and Congress responded by 
passing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 
When President Roosevelt signed the bill into law, there 
were new regulations for pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
follow when manufacturing drug products. The public had 
9 
better protection because these companies would have to show 
that a product had some record of safety before it could be 
marketed. The act essentially addressed product safety in 
two ways: first, all manufacturers of new products would be 
required to show documentation of safety before marketing 
and second, nonnarcotic medications would be categorized 
~ 
into prescription and over-the-counter categories. 
Narcotics had previously been changed to prescription-only 
status in 1914 by the Harrison Narcotic Act. The 1938 law, 
however, required that some nonnarcotic medications be 
available by prescription only. Although the distinction 
between prescription and over-the-counter products was loose 
until the Durham-Humphrey Amendment in 1951, 
10 
the guidelines were generally accepted. 
The effect of the 1938 law was sUbstantial as companies 
shifted their marketing efforts from the ultimate consumer 
to the physician. There were advantages for the larger 
pharmaceutical companies as the cost to document safety was 
somewhat prohibitive for the small pharmaceutical houses. 
Although this bill gave an added degree of safety to the 
consumers in this country, there was no regulation that 
addressed the issue of product efficacy. 
The 1951 Durham-Humphrey Amendment 
In 1951, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment specified the 
distinction between prescription and nonprescription 
medications. Drugs fell into one of three categories: 
narcotics, which were later classified as controlled 
substances, prescription medicines, and over-the-counter 
products. The distinction between these categories of drugs 
was determined by whether a drug could be used safely 
without physician supervision. 
The Kefauver-Harris Amendment of 1962 
It was not until 1962 that Congress enacted specific 
safety and efficacy guidelines for all pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. In 1962 the thalidomide scandal provided the 
impetus for this legislation. Thalidomide was available in 
Europe and was used as a sedative. Unfortunately, when 
pregnant women used this drug, it caused severe congenital 
11 
defects in their unborn children. Sufficient evidence to 
sUbstantiate the problem came after hundreds of babies had 
been born with horrible anomalies. 6 In the united States, 
the problem was smaller because the medication had only 
been released to physicians who were trying it on a limited 
number of patients. Although the number of children born 
with defects was smaller in the united States, the public 
outcry was no less strong. 
Congress, through Senators Kefauver and Harris, 
legislated a whole new process by which medications would be 
allowed on the market. The process required extensive 
clinical testing for both efficacy and safety.7 The 
clinical testing required drug companies to perform 
randomized and well-documented clinical studies. 
State Antisubstitution Laws 
Other important trends occurred during the period of 
increasing federal legislation that prompted passage of 
significant state laws which would also impact the 
pharmaceutical industry for decades. There was a tremendous 
influx of new and important drug products just after World 
War II and into the 1950s. 8 In particular, physicians had 
new antibiotics available to treat infections and a new 
class of drugs called phenothiazines to treat mental 
illness. There were also tremendous opportunities for 
profits by the pharmaceutical companies who were granted 17 
12 
year patents on new medications. 
The potential also existed for unscrupulous companies 
to make look-alike drugs and steal away some of the profits 
from the companies that had discovered them.4 In some 
instances a few drug companies sold products that looked 
very similar to the innovator's product and supposedly 
contained the same active drug. A pharmacy could purchase 
such counterfeit products at a greatly reduced price, charge 
the patient as if it were the innovator product, and make 
much higher profits. Because of the potential for lost 
revenue by brand name companies, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PMA) lobbied hard for specific 
legislation to protect them. The American Pharmaceutical 
Association (APhA) supported their efforts as did the 
American Medical Association {AMA).4 Both groups were 
concerned about potential harm to patients who might receive 
inferior medication and the destabilizing effect the 
lost profits might have on the brand name manufacturers. 
In the mid 1950s, after considerable efforts on the 
part of these three organizations, all states passed some 
form of antisubstitution legislation which gave complete 
power to the prescriber to choose the specific drug product. 
The pharmacist was required to dispense the exact brand name 
of drug written by the physician and could not sUbstitute 
"look alike" or generic (same active ingredient) medication. 
13 
Changes in the 1960s Bring New Perspectives 
The decade of the 1960s brought about several important 
changes in the medical arena. These changes ultimately 
affected the attitudes of legislators regarding the state 
antisubstitution laws. The first change was the perception 
within the medical community that the united states had a 
strong agency to oversee pharmaceutical manufacturers, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). All available evidence 
suggested that this agency could uphold the public safety 
with regard to medication and also protect the rights of 
innovator companies. There was no longer a perceived threat 
of counterfeit medication robbing brand name companies of 
their legitimate profits. 
Another factor that led to change in the 1960s was the 
strengthening of pharmaceutical education. Many people 
began to recognize the pharmacist as the best person to 
judge the quality and cost of prescription medication. 9 
Possibly the most important factor to change 
perspectives on the state antisubstitution laws was the 
passage of amendments, Title XVIII and Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. Congress passed these two bills in 
1965 and established Medicare (Title XVIII), a health care 
benefit for the elderly, and Medicaid (Title XIX), a health 
care plan for the poor. lO Congress considered adding a 
government subsidized health insurance plan to the original 
Social Security Act of 1935, but the AMA opposed it and 
14 
plan never passed. Now with Medicare and Medicaid in place, 
the federal government accepted the idea that citizens of 
the united states who could not afford healthcare or who 
were aged, should have it provided to them. 
When Title XVIII and Title XIX were passed in 1965, 
there was no clear cut analysis of what the programs would 
cost or how they would be funded in the long-term. While 
the programs themselves had great merit, no one in Congress 
predicted the cost overruns and budgeting problems these 
programs would create over the next 25 years. ll 
The constant and dramatic increases in health care 
inflation linked the Medicaid and Medicare legislation to 
the change in attitude regarding the antisubstitution laws. 
By 1970, it was obvious to Congress that changes were needed 
to control the dramatic escalation of medical bills. In 
1972, the federal government established Peer Review 
Organizations (PRO) to examine the legitimacy of medical 
claims. ll Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah was instrumental 
in sponsoring a bill that created the Professional Standards 
Review organization (PSRO) .10 The PRO and PSRO were not 
formal organizations, but rather a formal structure to 
facilitate peer review. The intent of the legislation 
was to reduce expenditures by hospitals and physicians. 
At the same time, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare developed a new plan called Maximum Allowable 
Cost-Estimated Acquisition Cost (MAC-EAC). This program was 
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implemented in 1976 and set limits for reimbursement on some 
medications that were available from multiple sources (i.e., 
generic drugs). The stumbling block for the federal 
government was that state laws made it illegal for 
pharmacists to sUbstitute one brand for another, without 
permission from the prescriber. without legislative relief, 
the pharmacist was in a position of being reimbursed for a 
generic (multisource) drug according to MAC guidelines, 
while state laws would require that a brand name must be 
dispensed. 
The answer appeared to be the repeal of the state anti-
sUbstitution laws. APhA reversed its stand from the 1950s 
and supported the repeal of these laws. 4 They saw an 
opportunity to expand the role of pharmacists by allowing 
them to choose the specific prescription drug product and at 
the same time save the federal government a considerable 
amount of money. The federal government saw this as a 
financial issue: brand name medications cost more than 
generic versions and bulging Medicaid and Medicare budgets 
could no longer afford to pay the difference. 
Groups in the health care field had a different 
perspective. The AMA, PMA, and the National Association of 
Chain Drug stores (NACDS) came out in opposition to the 
repeal of the state antisubstitution laws. 4 strom and others 
classified the motives of these groups into four categories: 
economics, quality, physician prerogatives, and equivalency. 
16 
These issues will be discussed in detail later, but it is 
important to note that a controversy ensued that divided the 
pharmacy profession. 12 
In the end, federal officials received the support they 
needed and over a period of several years, all states 
repealed laws which prevented substitution by pharmacists. 4 
The AMA gained one concession in that prescribers could 
prevent the sUbstitution of medication if it was deemed 
medically necessary. 
Officials at the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) were quick to insist that certain medications be 
dispensed in generic form (unless otherwise specified by the 
physician.) Although Medicaid is a shared program between 
the federal government and the states, the individual states 
administer it. The states had a choice whether to comply 
with the federal guidelines or not, but noncompliance meant 
no matching federal monies for the Medicaid program. Every 
state originally complied, but there has been movement on 
the part of some states to operate their own programs. 
The Drug Price Competition Act of 1984 
One last piece of legislation that had a sUbstantial 
impact on the generic drug industry was passed in 1984. The 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act was 
designed to facilitate the entry of generic medication into 
the market. Congress attempted to protect brand name 
17 
companies who were losing investments due to long approval 
times by the FDA.12 Brand name companies welcomed the bill 
because there were some specific products whose 17 year 
patents were close to expiring by the time the FDA granted 
approval to market the medication. Some drugs, for example, 
took 15 years to gain FDA approval, which left only two 
years of noncompetitive marketing to recover research and 
development costs. The 1984 legislation allowed a minimum 
of five years of noncompetition for these drug products, no 
matter how much time the approval process required. 
Generic manufacturers were also pleased with the 
legislation because it changed the approval process after a 
medication had lost its patent. Prior to this legislation, 
a company that desired to make the generic version of a drug 
had to submit all the safety and efficacy studies the 
innovator companies performed. This made a generic 
medication costly and the research redundant, since the 
brand name company had already shown the safety and 
efficacy of the product. The 1984 bill outlined an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which required the 
generic manufacturer to show bioequivalence with the brand 
name product and good manufacturing procedures. These 
requirements were far less expensive than testing for safety 
and efficacy, which opened the door for smaller 
pharmaceutical companies to enter the more lucrative generic 
market. 13 Schwartz estimated the 1984 legislation expanded 
the generic drug market by two billion dollars a year. 14 
Concerns About Substituting Generics 
For Brand Names 
In the early years that pharmacists were allowed to 
sUbstitute generic for brand name products, there was a 
18 
surprising lack of interest on the part of many pharmacists 
to do so. Also, consumers were reluctant to take generics. 
Although state Medicaid programs mandated generic usage in 
some cases, this portion of prescription business was 
generally small. An analysis of drug sUbstitution patterns 
in California in 1977 showed low generic usage (below 14%).4 
This trend continued on a national level. A study in 1985 
showed that after 10 years of open sUbstitution 
opportunities only 14.7% of all prescriptions were filled 
generically in the unites states. I5 
Many hypotheses have been presented to explain these 
behaviors by pharmacists and consumers. strom and his 
colleagues believed the lack of substitution was caused by 
concerns for equivalency, quality, and economic factors. 8 
Equivalency has triggered the greatest debate among 
health care officials because there are many ways to 
consider whether two products are equivalent. There are 
three basic definitions to examine when comparing 
pharmaceutical products with the same active ingredients: 
chemical equivalence, biological equivalence, and 
19 
therapeutic equivalence. 16-18 
Chemical (or pharmaceutical) equivalence is defined as 
two or more drug products that contain equal amounts of the 
same therapeutically active ingredients in the same dosage 
form. Biological equivalence (also called bioequivalence) 
is defined as two or more chemically equivalent drug 
products that produce comparable bioavailability 
characteristics in an individual when administered in the 
same dosage form. Essentially, this definition suggests 
comparing information such as how quickly each 
manufacturer's form of the same medication is absorbed into 
the blood stream and the maximum concentration each product 
achieves. Therapeutic equivalence is defined as two drug 
products that produce the same efficacy and/or toxicity.8 
Many health care professionals were concerned that the 
equivalence issue was not properly regulated to insure that 
patients would receive the same therapeutic response from 
brand name and generic medications. In response to this 
concern, the FDA published regulations for bioequivalence in 
January 1977. 13 Because of the importance of these 
guidelines they are quoted below: 
(1) For drugs first approved after 1962 and for older 
drugs that may have bioequivalence problems, the 
generic product must be shown to have the same 
extent of bioavailability as the innovator's by an 
appropriate method that shows that the mean extent 
of absorption (area under the curve or AUC) will 
not differ from that of the innovator's product by 
more than 20 percent; 
(2) the generic product must be shown to have the same 
rate of bioavailability as the innovator's by an 
appropriate method that shows the average maximum 
and minimum concentrations do not differ from those 
of the innovator's by more than 20 percent and that 
the times for the products to reach their maximum 
concentrations do not differ significantly. 
statistical methods will then be applied to ensure 
that the generic product is not excessively 
variable from dose to dose within patients. 
(3) For those drugs that cannot meet the statistical 
criteria due to inherent variability, the 75/75 
rule shall apply. A test will show that at least 
75 percent of the people tested do not show a 
variation of more than 25 percent between the 
innovator's and generic products. (In one 
chemical class of drugs, the psychotropic 
. phenothiazines, this criteria shall be expanded 
to allow 70 percent of the people tested to show 
a variation of 30 percent or less between the 
two products.) 
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Debates still continued regarding the types of specific 
tests that should be done, the types of patients used in 
testing, and how often testing should be performed. Another 
concern was informing health care professionals when 
bioequivalence problems were detected. In answer to this 
concern, the FDA compiled a text, Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also called the 
Orange Book). This text is a listing of medications that 
are assigned to one of five classifications. These 
classifications are: 
Class A drug products for which there are no known 
or suspected bioequivalence problems. 
Class B drug products that the FDA does not consider 
therapeutically equivalent. 
Class AB: drug products that require the manufacturer 
to submit bioavailability data to establish 
equivalency. 
Class BX: drug products where there is insufficient 
data to establish equivalency. 
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Class AP: Injectable aqueous solutions where there are 
different routes of administration. 
This book allows pharmacists to evaluate drug products to 
determine if any equivalence problem exists. 19 Although 
the Orange Book is a required test for all pharmacies in the 
united states, a study recently reported that many 
pharmacists have not been reading it. w 
The FDA determined that not all generics could be 
considered equivalent to the brand names. Medications such 
as levpthyroxine, theophylline, conjugated estrogens, 
thioridazine, phenytoin, and topical triamcinolone have 
documented equivalence problems. 21 26 Because some of these 
drugs had originally been "An rated, some pharmacists had 
their fears substantiated that government approved generics 
can have equivalence problems. The end result of this was 
evident in the previously reported study where only 14.7% of 
prescriptions were being filled generically after 10 years 
of open SUbstitution. 
The second issue strom raised which might have caused a 
reluctance on the part of pharmacists to substitute generics 
is continuous quality. This is a separate issue from 
equivalence because the manufacturer has to have the 
capability of reproducing the same product each time. In 
addition, pharmacists and others wondered if all generic 
companies had the funds, commitment, and ability to 
manufacture quality medications consistently. The health 
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care professions had to depend on the FDA to oversee the 
generic drug industry to insure that all companies complied 
with good manufacturing standards. Indeed, it was this very 
issue that led to a scandal in 1989 within the FDA and some 
generic companies. The following section examines this 
scandal in detail. 
The third issue strom raised was physician 
prerogati ve. 12 As previously stated, 12 the medical 
profession did not want to give up their right to choose the 
specific drug product. The AMA contended that physicians 
have a unique opportunity to evaluate a patient's response 
to prescribed medication. IS Their contention was not that 
the pharmacist was unqualified, but rather that the 
pharmacist was not in a position to follow patients' lab 
work and physical examination to evaluate the medication's 
effectiveness. 1s others argued that if a product was within 
bioequivalence standards, there should be no difference in 
therapeutic response. Many pharmacists were aware that 
specific physicians did not want their prescriptions 
substituted and that doing so could create animosity between 
themselves and the prescriber. This might have been a 
substantial factor in pharmacists substituting behavior. 
strom's final category was economics. 12 There were two 
monetary issues that impacted the amount of sUbstitution 
that occurred. The first was the cost of added inventory 
that generics were causing. Because some people wanted 
brand names and some people wanted generics, both products 
had to be stocked in the pharmacy. This cost pharmacists 
money as more inventory was required to be in stock. 
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The second monetary issue was more closely related to 
the patient than the pharmacist. A study of brand name and 
generic drug prices conducted in 1974 did indeed show a 
savings to the consumer.2 Although prescription drug prices 
are a big issue now, in the 1970s prescriptions were 
considered affordable. This study showed price savings of 
one to two dollars per prescription (see Table 1). The 
prices listed in this table represent the price for the most 
commonly prescribed strength of medication and most commonly 
prescribed quantity. Many customers may have perceived too 
low of benefit to accept generics on a wide scale. 
Although the pharmacist was engaged in continuing 
discussions and evaluations about substitution, the consumer 
was really not all that informed about this issue. 
Pharmacists have slowly been informing the public about the 
cost savings and the difference in price between brand name 
and generic products. It was not until 1989, however, that 
the national media gave considerable attention to generic 
medications. 
The FDA and Generic Drug Scandal of 1989 
The Drug Price Competition and Restoration Act of 1984 
caused a dramatic increase in the number of ANDAs submitted 
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Table 1 
Consumer Prices on Brand Name and Generic Prescription 













































* study conducted by A Gumbhir, PhD and C Rodowskas Jr., PhD. 
Reported in Am J Pub Health 1974;64(10):977-82. 
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to the FDA. 9 In addition to this increase in workload, 
congress also passed more than 20 pieces of legislation 
which increased FDA responsibilities and required added 
inspections and application reviews. 1 At the same time, the 
federal government was becoming more sensitive about the 
growing federal deficit. In response to this, President 
Reagan was elected with a plan to reduce the budget by 
curtailing government spending. He responded by cutting 
budgets to government regulatory agencies, including the 
FDA.l From 1980 to 1989 the number of FDA employees 
performing non-AIDS related tasks declined 13% (Figure 1). 
This set of circumstances paved the way for an FDA and 
generic drug industry scandal that became public in 1989. 
IOn July 11, 1988, Inspector General Investigators from 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appeared 
at the FDA and sealed off one of the offices. A 
comprehensive investigation ensued that lasted into early 
1989. By late April 1989, reports began to surface 
outlining the payment of illegal gratuities to three mid-
level FDA employees. Over the next six months, the 
pharmaceutical industry, medical professions, government and 
public were shocked to hear of irregularities at the FDA 
relating to fraudulent activities involving a small number 
of generic manufacturers. , A synopsis of the findings of 
this and subsequent FDA investigations through 1989, as well 
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presentation by Donald Hare, Special Assistant to the 
Director of Generic Drugs at the FDA. u 
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1. A vice-president of Pharmaceutical Basics (PBI) of 
Denver, Colorado, pled guilty to giving an unlawful 
gratuity to a former FDA supervisory chemist. Not 
directly related to these charges is the fact that this 
company had to recall fifty million doses of a drug, 
carbamazepine, used to prevent seizures, because of 
tablet dissolution problems. Reports indicated that 12 
patients experienced seizures while on the generic drug. 
There were also 2 deaths reported while patients took 
the generic drug, however it was never determined if the 
seizures or deaths were associated with this product. 
The vice-president was convicted of criminal charges and 
was sentenced. The ~ompany received letters outlining 
violations of Good Manufacturing Practices. 
2. Quantum Pharmics of Amityville, New York, which is owned 
by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, a brand name firm, was 
found guilty of misrepresenting information to the FDA 
involving three generic products. The agency found 
that Quantam made false statements and omitted 
information related to the production and testing of 
medication for which they were making application to 
manufacture. The FDA moved to withdraw approval of 25 
ANDAs. They also changed the rating for these products 
in the Orange Book from "AB" to "BX" which reflects the 
FDA's inability to determine equivalency with this 
product. Wyeth-Ayerst informed the FDA that Quantum 
would suspend all operations. 
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3. vitarine Pharmaceuticals of Springfield Gardens, New 
York, gave false information in their ANDAs for certain 
products. vitarine submitted brand name Dyzaide, Calan 
SR, Proventil Repetabs, Inderal LA, and Medrol 
samples as its own generic versions for bioequivalence 
testing. The FDA moved to withdraw approval for 25 
generic products which had to be removed from the 
market. In addition, the rating for the generic version 
of Dyazide was changed from "AB" to "BX". 
4. Par Pharmaceuticals of Spring Valley, New York, was 
guilty of giving illegal gratuities to two FDA review 
chemists. The FDA also found that their generic version 
of Maxzide was not the same formulation as outlined in 
the ANDA. In addition, Par had falsified some 
production records. Because of these findings, the FDA 
withdrew Par's license to manufacture three generic 
products: triamterene/hydrochlorthiazide, orphenadrine/ 
acetaminophen, and valproic acid. The ratings for these 
drugs was changed in the Orange Book from "AB" to "BX". 
5. Bolar Pharmaceuticals of Copiague, New York, submitted 
brand name Mellaril and Macrodantin instead of their 
generic product for bioequivalence testing. The firm 
eventually pled guilty to 20 criminal charges of 
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fraudulent generic drug applications. The FDA withdrew 
approval for all involved medication and a federal court 
eventually fined the company 10 million dollars. 29 
6. Barre-National of Baltimore, Maryland, had deficiencies 
in manufacturing procedures. They also withheld the 
results of some stability tests because of failures. 
The FDA demanded the recall of their hydrocortisone 
lotion and a theophylline syrup and initiated the 
suspension of distribution of 20 other products. 
7. Sidmak Laboratories of East Hanover, New Jersey, was 
guilty of manufacturing a superpotent vitamin product. 
The testing facility, Quality Research Laboratories, had 
inaccurately tested and approved a product that 
contained 50 times the labeled quantity of vitamin D. 
Because vitamin D is a fat soluble vitamin and can cause 
toxicity in high doses, the FDA treated this as a 
serious health threat. The FDA recalled this product, 
as well as another product, phenytoin extended release 
capsules. This action was taken because of a lack of 
trust in the testing procedures for both products. 
8. Superpharm of Bayshore, New York, was found to have 
submitted research and development records with 
irregularities and discrepancies involving six products. 
The FDA changed the ratings for diazepam and ibuprofen 
from "AB" to "BX" in the Orange Book. 
9. American Therapeutics Incorporated (ATI) of Bohemia, New 
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York, was named in criminal action involving the payment 
of an illegal gratuity to an FDA chemist. Besides 
eventual fines that were levied, the FDA rescinded 
approval for their chlorzoxazone 500mg tablets and 
changed the ratings on their versions of prednisone, 
clonidine, and lorazepam form "ABu to "BX". 
10. Pharmafair of Hauppague, New York, had a history of 
manufacturing problems. Their entire 1988 production of 
phenylephrine ophthalmic solution and numerous lots of 
nystatin suspension were recalled due to variation in 
potency. 
11. Zenith Labs of North Vale, New Jersey, had minor 
problems with Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) at a 
plant in Puerto Rico. The plant had been placed on 
inactive status so no other action was taken. 
12. The President of Quad Pharmaceuticals of Indianapolis, 
Indiana, conspired to pay illegal gratuities to three 
FDA chemists. Inspections of the facilities found no 
significant deficiencies. Criminal charges and fines 
were eventually levied against the president and 
company. 
13. Watson Laboratories of Corona, California, had 
significant deficiencies in record keeping and 
operations. The FDA sent a "Ten Day Letter" demanding 
immediate compliance with these standards and 
regulations. 
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14. Chelsea Labs of west Hampstead, New York, produced the 
drugs verapamil, disopyramide, perphenazine/ 
amitriptyline, oxazepam, and plain perphenazine which 
all fell below regulatory standards. Chelsea received a 
"Ten Day Letter" demanding that the give the FDA 
information which would indicate that all problems had 
been solved. 
15. The three chemists who worked for the FDA were fired, 
convicted of accepting illegal gratuities, and sentenced 
by the courts. 
~ In August of 1989, the FDA began an extensive sampling 
and analysis program of the 30 most prescribed generic drugs 
and their brand name counterparts. 30 These products are 
listed in Table 2. Three hundred chemists performed 36,000 
tests. The chemists found a total of 27 products (1.1%) to 
be outside the FDA specifications. This rate is comparable 
to that found in brand name medications. 28 
Extensive inspections were performed at hundreds of 
generic and brand name firms. The findings of these 
inspections have just been reported above. The majority of 
these inspections revealed no problems in ANDA or 
manufacturing practices. Many of the manufacturing problems 
they did find were of a routine nature that FDA deals with 
regularly. 28 Manufacturers paid the illegal gratuities to 
encourage the chemists to speed up the approval of the 



















Top 30 Drugs Examined by the FDA 
Following Generic Scandal 
Name of Drug Rank Name of Drug 
Amoxicillin 15 Diazepam 
Penicillin 16 Phenobarbital 
Ampicillin 17 Hydrocort Cr 
Prednisone 18 Trimeth/Sulfa 
Tetracycline 19 Dipyridamole 
Hydrochlorthiazide 20 Nitroglycerin 
Doxycycline 21 Nystatin 
Ibuprofen 22 Triamcinolone Cr 
Erythromycin Stearate 23 Propox Nap/APAP 
Acetaminophen/Codiene 24 Lorazepam 
Erythromycin Base 25 Imipramine 
Cephalexin 26 Thyroxine 
Amitriptyline 27 Metronidazole 
Furosemide 28 Meclizine 
Allopurinol 30 Ferrous sulfate 
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that any fast tracking actually occurred. 
During the last six months of 1989 and first few months 
of 1990, the public and medical community were exposed to 
numerous headline stories in all forms of media which 
reported on the findings of fraud and corruption in the FDA 
and generic drug industry. Many of the reports were 
accurate, but some sensationalized the problem, suggesting 
more widespread irregularities than actually existed. The 
following reports are examples of what pharmacists, 
physicians, and consumers were reading. 
From the Wall street Journa131 
In its first crackdown on generic drug companies 
involved in fraudulent activities, the Food and Drug 
Administration revoked recent approvals granted to Par 
Pharmaceutical Inc. and American Therapeutics Inc ..... 
FDA Commissioner Frank E. Young emphasized that if the 
generic drug scandal worsens "there is a real 
possibility" that the industry "may be totally 
discredited." He added that unless the agency moves 
swiftly "to safeguard the generic drug review system, 
the potential for a loss in public trust in generic 
drugs may be realized." 
From USA TODAy32 
An expert panel of the American Academy of Family 
Physicians next month will urge the nation's 60,000 
family doctors to stop prescribing generic drugs for 
some patients •.•. The committee's findings come in 
the wake of a credibility crisis already faced by the 
generic drug industry involving illegal payoffs 
to Food and Drug Administration scientists •..• The 
Congressional Subcommittee Chairman, Rep. John Dingell, 
D-Mich. told Congress last month "the reality is the 
(approval) system does not work. Even without the 
payoffs, the system was characterized by arbitrariness 
and lack of procedures and standards." 
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From the Deseret News33 
The title of this article was "Danger cited To Users of 
Generics." 
The Utah Pharmaceutical Association has issued a 
warning to users of Dyazide and Dilantin to immediately 
stop use of potential dangerous generic forms of the 
drugs in favor of established brand-names •.•. An 
attorney for Bolar (Labs) recently disclosed to the FDA 
that an internal investigation revealed that documents 
used to gain FDA approval apparently had been 
falsified •••• Bolar is under criminal investigation for 
applications it submitted for several drugs including 
its generic version of Dyazide •••• Bolar informed the 
federal Food and Drug Administration that it could not 
be sure the products were therapeutically 
~nterchangeable with the brand-name counterparts. 
Exactly how much of an impact these news stories had on 
consumers has been studied by researchers around the 
country. Gallup conducted a nationwide poll asking opinions 
of generics in the Fall of 1989. The results of this poll 
indicated a high awareness of the FDA scandal and 77% of 
those polled had changed their opinion of generic medication 
in general.~ Perri and others studied consumer attitudes 
regarding generic drugs and found confidence had 
deteriorated from studies done before the 1989 scandal. 35 
The amount of rhetoric pharmacists received regarding the 
investigation was much higher than that seen in the general 
media. Almost all of the professional journals and 
pharmacy newsletters have continued to report new 
information regarding generic drugs and the effectiveness of 
the FDA. 36,37 ,38 
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Managed Care: A Solution for the 1990s 
One last factor is important to understand the entire 
generic drug issue. This factor is the increasing number of 
insurance companies who pay for prescription medication but 
mandate the use of generic drugs. This situation might be 
causing conflicts with some pharmacists who are concerned 
about equivalency and quality, but who must dispense 
generics to follow third party guidelines. It might also be 
causing a conflict between patients who do not trust 
generics and pharmacists who must dispense them to be 
reimbursed appropriately by the insurance company. To 
understand how the generic guidelines developed, it is 
important to review the evolution of third party payers in 
the united States. 
As the cost of medical care began to inflate 
dramatically in the late 1960s and early 1970s everyone 
looked for ways to control these costs. Instead of simply 
paying medical bills as they accumulated, the government and 
other third party payers wanted to control the utilization 
of medical care prospectively. One answer seemed to be 
Health Maintenance organizations (HMOs). Federal legislation 
nurtured HMOs in 1974 when the government elected to 
subsidize these fledgling companies in hopes they would 
better control medical costs in the Unites States. Over the 
years, hybrid organizations have developed with new formats 
to attract different segments of the medical care market. 
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Under the general title of managed care operators, there are 
now a variety of organizations which include: staff model 
HMOs, Independent Practice Associations (IPAs), Preferred 
Provider Organizations (PPOs), Pharmaceutical Services 
Administrative Organizations (PSAOs), as well as the 
traditional indemnity carriers. The ability of each of 
these companies to manage medical costs is different as is 
the level of medical care which they offer. 
The Staff Model HMO 
This type of organization operates its own clinics and 
hires its own medical practitioners including physicians, 
dentists, nurses, and pharmacists. 39 Patients must go to 
one of the HMO's own clinics for medical treatment or to get 
a prescription filled. There is generally tight control 
over the physician's prescribing habits because the 
practitioner works directly for the HMO. The pharmacies in 
staff model HMOs operate formularies which cut down on 
investments in drug inventories. In many cases a patient 
would not be able to get a brand name medication if it were 
available from multiple sources because the product would 
not be stocked in the pharmacy. Patients who choose to use 
HMOs might have to accept the fact that they will be given 
generic medications or they must use outside pharmacies to 
purchase the brand name at their own expense. 
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Independent Practice Association (IPAl 
Many staff model HMOs also operate IPA models as well. 
In this program the managed care company contracts with 
providers in independent practice to provide certain kinds 
of care.~ Patients may use one of the physicians or 
pharmacies who are under contract for these services. 
Control over the physician's prescribing practices is good, 
but not nearly as strong as that exercised by the staff 
model because the practitioners are not full-time 
employees of the company. On the other hand, IPAs usually 
generate enough of a patient base that physicians want to 
remain in good standing with these companies. The whole 
purpose of a practitioner in private practice contracting 
with an IPA is to increase their patient base. with all of 
the HMOs and PPOs in the health care system, many physicians 
are losing patients to programs they are not contracted to 
take. There mayor may not be a formulary with the IPA 
model, but generics are usually mandated. In most cases 
with an IPA there is a financial incentive for the patient 
to use generic medications and some financial penalty if 
brand names are used. 
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
The Preferred Provider Organization is a loosely 
structured network of providers that perform various medical 
services.~ The concept is to contract with a limited 
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number of providers for services and ask them for a very 
competitive reimbursement rate in return for large numbers 
of members. Unlike HMOs there is typically no formulary 
with these programs because the control over the prescriber 
is very limited. Most of these plans, however, offer 
financial incentives for the patient to accept generic 
medications and an increasing number of the plans are 
mandating them. 
Pharmacy Services Administrative 
Organization (PSAO) 
The PSAO concept became popular in the 1980s as the 
independent pharmacies' answer to the PPO networks. 
Because many companies were negotiating with chain 
pharmacies for PPO contracts, the independents were losing 
their customer bases. 41 Their response was to form groups 
that could purchase pharmaceutical products together at a 
better discount and to contract with third party plans. The 
PSAO fills an administrative function only by negotiating 
contracts on behalf of independent pharmacies and acting as 
an intermediary to the plan and the stores. The 
organization has no control over the physician's prescribing 
habits and although generics are encouraged, they usually 
are not mandated. This is usually an issue for the specific 
third party plan and has little to do with the PSAO itself. 
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Indemnity Programs 
This kind of program allows the patient to see any 
physician or pharmacy they choose. These plans offer little 
incentive for the patient to choose a provider who will 
closely monitor medical costs. When a patient has a 
prescription filled, they pay the full cash price at the 
time of purchase. After submitting their receipt, the 
insurance company reimburses them for the purchase. The 
only way this kind of program controls cost is by requiring 
the patient to pay for the medical treatment at the time of 
service. Patients are less likely to pay the full price of a 
prescription they do not really need. Generics are 
encouraged by these plans, and financially, patients would 
save money if they used them. The problem is that people 
know they will be reimbursed a high percentage of the price 
anyway, so they will use whichever product they desire. 
Each year the managed care companies take a larger 
share of the prescription drug market.41 This has had a 
dramatic impact on the practice of pharmacy as a whole, but 
for the purposes of this study, it is important to note how 
this has affected drug product selection. The market share 
for generic medications was only 2% in 1982. In 1989 it was 
33.1% (Figure 2). Managed care programs that mandated the 
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Literature reports indicate that pharmacists and the 
public may be unwilling to promote or accept generic 
medications. The research and information presented would 
indicate that the low generic usage might be related to any 
of the following: 
1. Physicians who do not maintain a high level of 
confidence in generics want their patients to receive 
brand names to prevent variable concentrations of 
medication in the blood. Therefore, they write Dispense 
as written (DAW) on the prescription to prevent the 
pharmacist from substituting. 
2. Pharmacists who are concerned about issues of 
bioequivalence and quality do not promote the use of 
generic medication. 
3. Pharmacists may not be willing to save a person money on 
a generic medication at the risk of a customer complaint 
involving a generic product, so they do not promote 
them. 
4. Consumers, having heard the publicity surrounding the 
FDA scandal want to purchase only brand name products. 
5. Consumers, having had their physician or pharmacist tell 
them generic medications might not be equivalent to 
brand names, decide to avoid generic products. Now that 
managed care firms are mandating the use of generics, 
there might be some conflicts as described earlier. 
ECCLES H 
Either the pharmacist has no confidence in generic 
medications, but must use them to comply with third party 
regulations or the patient may be required to use generics 
when they would feel more confident with the brand names. 
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This set of potential conflicts encourage study into 
contemporary consumer attitudes regarding generic 
medications and the patient's trust in the pharmacist's 
judgement about them. Therefore, the objectives of this 
study are to (i) assess the current knowledge consumers have 
about the generic drug scandal of 1989, (ii) investigate the 
level of confidence consumers have in generic medications, 
and (iii) study the level of trust people have in their 
pharmacist with regard to receiving information about 
generic medications. 
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Description of Sample 
Because consumers with prescription benefit coverage 
offer more potential for conflict with the pharmacist over 
the use of generic medication, the investigator determined 
that this group should act as the study population. 
Therefore, a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) in Salt 
Lake city was selected for this study. Scripcard Inc. has a 
total enrollment of just over 63,000 families and was 
willing to allow their members to be surveyed. Scripcard 
offers an incentive to members who accept a generic 
medication, but generic usage is not mandatory. Scripcard 
has over 100 plans in 15 states. The plan designs are 
typical for PPOs and the demographics of the members are 
diverse. 
One plan was selected at random that enrolled 889 
members in five different states. There was nothing 
outstanding or atypical about the plan chosen. A 
questionnaire and a letter from the president of ScripCard 
expressing support for the study were mailed to every member 
in the selected group with a prepaid return envelope (see 
Appendix). scripCard's cover letter suggested to the 
members that answers to the survey could influence future 
decisions regarding the use of generic medication by the 
Ppo. 
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Surveys were mailed directly to selected members in a 
ScripCard company envelope. Each survey was stamped with a 
serial number so that if a second mailing was to be done, 
the respondents who mailed surveys back could be identified. 
The surveys were mailed out January 28, 1991 and respondents 
were asked to return the surveys by March 1, 1991. 
Questionnaire Description 
The questionnaire began with some questions regarding 
ScripCard benefits and services. An analysis of the 
responses to these questions, however, will not be included 
in this text, because the responses are not directly related 
to the topic which this study was intended to examine. 
An introductory paragraph was included at the beginning 
of the survey form. The intent of this paragraph was to 
give each respondent a definition of the words "generic 
medication" to alleviate any confusion and provide 
instructions on how to answer the survey questions. 
There were four different issues addressed in the 
survey which all related to generic medication. The issues 
were (i) the respondent's opinion of generic drugs, (ii) the 
respondent's opinion of their pharmacist, (III) whether the 
respondent was aware of the generic drug scandal of 1989, 
and (iv) demographic information regarding the respondent. 
The questionnaire contained a set of statements about 
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generic medications which the respondents were asked to rate 
in the following manner: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, or strongly agree. In order to deter 
personal prejudice, half of the statements were stated from 
a negative perspective about generics and the other half 
were stated in a positive manner. 
In terms of the respondent's opinion about generic 
drugs, there were some key features in the questionnaire 
that previous researchers had not included in their studies. 
A number of questions asked whether respondents had actually 
tried generic medications or if their opinions were formed 
by information from other people. Other questions related 
to whether the respondent's opinions were absolute or 
variable, depending on the type of medication. Three 
different kinds of medication were specifically addressed in 
these questions: chronic medications for serious diseases 
such as hypertension, diabetes, or cancer; medications for 
symptomatic relief such as coughing, pain, or cramping; or 
medications for birth control. The final question asked how 
large a price differential must exist between the brand name 
and generic products for the respondent to choose the 
generic. 
In terms of the pharmacist, the key question asked 
whether respondents trusted their pharmacist. If their 
pharmacist expressed an opinion of generic medication to a 
patient, would that patient trust the pharmacist 
49 
sufficiently to alter their purchasing habits? 
Demographic information was requested of respondents to 
allow examination of the relationship between selected 
variables and opinions about generic medication. 
Demographic variables collected were age, sex, level of 
education, and level of income. 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions 
were u~ilized for analysis and to summarize the data. 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients were calculated to 





Of the 889 surveys that were mailed, 285 (32%) were 
returned with some form of response. Only three (.3%) were 
returned because of incorrect addresses. Two of the 
respondents (.2%) returned blank surveys (one reported no 
medication use and one no longer received Scrip Card 
benefits.) Eight of the respondents 9.9%) answered only one 
side of the questionnaire, so their responses are not 
included in the results. This left 275 completed surveys 
which represents a usable response rate of 31%. 
Demographic Description of Respondents 
Of the 275 respondents, 211 (78.1%) were female, 59 
(21.9%) were male, and 5 did not indicate gender. There was 
a wide distribution of ages (Table 3) with the highest 
number of responders being in the category of 21 to 30 
years. The other categories were fairly evenly distributed. 
The distribution of respondents by educational level is 
listed in Table 4. Forty-two percent (113/269) of all 
respondents listed "attended college" as their highest 
achieved educational level. The next highest response was 
from those who graduated from high school. 
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Table 3 
Respondent Distribution by Age 
Age Group Number of Respondents (%) 
21 - 30 years 71 (26.2) 
31 - 40 56 (20.6) 
41 - 50 48 (17.7) 
51 - 60 53 (19.6) 
61 and over 43 (15.9) 
Total 271 (100) 
* missing four responses 
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Table 4 
Respondent Distribution by Educational Level 
Level of Education Number of Respondents (%) 
Attended High School 13 ( 4.8) 
Graduated from High School 72 (26.8) 
Attended College 113 (42.0) 
Graduated from College 57 (21.2) 
Attended Graduate School 14 ( 5.2) 
Total 269 (100) 
* missing six responses 
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Respondents' distribution of annual family income is 
listed in Table 5. The greatest number of those surveyed, 
73 (28.9%), reportedly made between $15,001 and $25,000. 
The next highest response rate, 53 (20.9%), came from those 
reportedly making under $15,000 per year. As the categories 
of income represented higher salaries, the number of 
respondents got smaller. 
Respondent's Opinions About Generic Medication 
In Table 6, the responses to questions regarding 
opinions of generic medication are reported. Forty-five 
percent (120/266) agreed with the statement, "In my opinion 
generic medications are as effective as brand name 
medications." The next highest response, 87 (31.9%), came 
from the neutral category. Only 65 people (23.8%) disagreed 
with the statement; however, the mean response was neutral 
(3.22 ± 1.05). 
When the statement read, "I have actually used generic 
medications and have been satisfied with the results", there 
were 145 respondents (53.9%) who agreed. There were only 49 
(18.3%) who disagreed. Because the number of neutral 
respondents was significant, the mean was 3.48 ± .84. This 
would indicate a neutral to slightly positive response. 
When given the statement, "I trust the FDA (Food and 
Drug Administration). If generic medications pass FDA 
standards, they must be as good as brand name medications," 
45% (123/273) of respondents agreed. Again, there were a 
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Table 5 
Respondents Distribution by Income Level 
Level of Income Number of Respondents (%) 
0 $15,000 53 (20.9) 
15,001 25,000 73 (28.9) 
25,001 35,000 44 (17.4) 
35,001 45,000 39 (15.4) 
45,001 55,000 23 ( 9.1) 
55,001 and over 21 ( 8.3) 
Total 253 (100) 
* missing 22 responses 
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Table 6 
Responses to Questions About Opinions of Generics 
Responses N (%) 
statements 
SD D N A SA 
Generics are as 19 46 87 95 25 
effective as the ( 6.9) (16.9) (31.9) (34.9) ( 9.2) 
brand. names. 
I have tried generics 23 26 75 113 32 
and was satisfied ( 8.5) ( 9.7) (27.9) (42.0) (11.9) 
with them. 
If generics pass FDA 21 48 81 96 27 
standards, they ( 7.7) (17.6) (29.7) (35.1) ( 9.9) 
must be as good. 
I usually ask if a 40 60 93 59 20 
generic is (14.7) (22 . 0) (34.2) (21.7) ( 7.4) 
available. 
so = Strongly Disagree 
D = Disagree 
N = Neutral 
A = Agree 
SD = Strongly Agree 
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large number of neutral responses which brought the mean to 
3.22 ± 1.08}. 
The last statement about generics indicated that the 
respondent usually asked if a generic was available. The 
highest response, 93 (34.2%), was neutral. The other 
responses were evenly distributed giving an overall slightly 
negative mean of 2.84 + 1.14. 
Respondent's opinions About Their Pharmacist 
~able 7 shows the results of the two statements 
regarding the respondents' opinion of their pharmacists. 
The first statement in this table indicates that respondents 
reportedly value their pharmacists as a source of 
information about generic medication. The majority of 
respondents, 195 (71.9%), agreed. Only 19 respondents (7%) 
gave a negative response. The mean response was more 
positive at 3.93 ±.923. 
The second statement was made to see what influence the 
pharmacist has in the decision of choosing a generic 
medication. The statement was, "If the pharmacist asked me 
if I wanted to buy a generic medication in order to save 
money, I would do it." The statement did not indicate the 
pharmacist had explained anything about the generic product. 
It only stated that the pharmacist asked if a generic was 
desired. The data indicate 59.4% of the respondents would 
purchase the generic just because they were asked. There 
were a fairly high number of respondents, 
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Table 7 
Responses to Questions About Generics and Pharmacists 
statements 
My pharmacist is an 
impor:tant source 
of information to 
me about generic 
medication. 
If my pharmacist 
asked me if I 
wanted a generic 







SO = Strongly Disagree 
D = Disagree 
N = Neutral 
A = Agree 
SA = Strongly Agree 






















63 (23%), who were neutral. The mean response was neutral 
to slightly positive at 3.58 + 1.13. 
Respondents' Opinions of Discretionary 
Generic Substitution 
Table 8 also shows the data on statements regarding 
specific categories of medication. These statements were 
used to determine if people's opinions of generics are 
absolute or dependent on the type of medication. When the 
medication is used for a condition such as diabetes, high 
blood pressure or cancer, only 55 (20.1%) of the respondents 
would use the generic product. The statement was made in a 
negative form. This indicates that the mean of 3.57 
± 1.22 is a statement of some agreement that these 
respondents would choose the brand name product for these 
conditions. 
The second category of medication studied was that for 
symptomatic relief of coughs, pain, or cramping. A much 
higher number of people, 129 (47%), indicated they would 
take the generic drug. Again the statement was made in a 
negative way so that the mean of 2.70 + 1.07 shows some 
support for the generic product. 
The final category of medication examined was 
preventive drugs such as birth control pills. Only 64 
respondents (24.7%) would purchase the generic product. The 
mean was overall neutral at 3.23 ± 1.18 given a negative 
statement on generics for preventive products. 
Table 8 
Responses to Questions About Generics 
and Medical Conditions 
Responses N (%) 
statements 
SD D N A 
I woulp not buy a 
generic for 15 40 74 63 
diabetes, HBP, or ( 5.5) (14.6) (27.0) (23.0) 
cancer. 
I would not buy a 
generic for pain, 30 99 89 34 
cramping, or (10.9) (36.1) (32.5) (12.4) 
coughing. 
I would not buy a 
generic for 22 42 100 44 
birth control ( 8.5) (16.2) (38.6) (17.0) 
pills. 
SD = Strongly Disagree 
D = Disagree 
N = Neutral 
A = Agree 










Finally respondents were asked to indicate how much 
money they would need to save in order to purchase a generic 
rather than a brand name. The statement read, "In order for 
me to choose a generic, I would need to save $ __ " The 
greatest number of respondents, 130 (52.6%) indicated they 
would need to save $5.00 or more. The remaining responses 
were quite evenly distributed with 82 (31.7%) in the $3.00 
to $4.00 range and 44 (15.7%) in the $1.00 to $2.00 
categories. 
Respondent's Knowledge of the Generic 
Drug Scandal of 1989 
The question that intended to examine the consumer's 
knowledge of the generic drug scandal of 1989 was asked in 
this manner, "Have you heard of any publicity regarding 
generic medication in the past few years?" This was a 
simple yes or no question and the responses were quite even 
with 132 (48%) answering "yes" and 143 (52%) answering "no". 
If the respondents answered "no" to this question, they 
were asked to skip to the demographic questions. If they 
answered "yes" to the question about publicity they were 
asked to complete the next nine statements. These 
statements were intended to determine what kind of publicity 
the respondent had heard. Table 9 displays the results of 
these statements. 
with regard to decreasing the respondent's faith in the 
FDA, the highest response was in the neutral category with 
Table 9 
Responses to the Questions Regarding the 
Publicity surrounding Generics 
Responses N (%) 
statements 
so 0 N A 
The publicity I am 
familiar with de- 7 23 55 35 
creased my faith ( 5.4) (20.5) (42.3) (26.9) 
in the FDA. 
The pUblicity de-
creased my faith 8 27 41 47 
in generic med- ( 6.1) (20.5) (31.1) (35.6) 
ications. 
More recent public-
ity has been more 4 27 50 45 
favorable to the ( 3.0) (20.8) (38.5) (34.7) 
FDA and generics. 
Irregularities were 
found at the FDA 11 21 54 39 
and with some ( 8.5) (16.3) (41.9) (30.2) 
generics- but now 
they are as safe 
as ever. 
When I first heard 
the publicity, I 16 17 59 25 
asked my pharm- 12.8) (13.6) (47.2) (20.0) 
acist to explain. 
Today I trust the 
FDA and their 8 26 51 34 
ability to regu- ( 6.2) (20.2) (39.5) (26.4) 
late generics. 
SD = Strongly Disagree 
D = Disagree 
N = Neutral 
A = Agree 
















55 (42.3%). Forty-five respondents (34.6%) indicated their 
faith in the FDA was decreased. The overall response rate 
was neutral at 3.13 ±.97. 
The next statement indicated that publicity decreased 
the respondent's faith in generic medication. There were 56 
people (42.3%) who agreed with this statement. A 
significant number, 41 (31.1%), were neutral. This caused 
the overall rate of response to be neutral at 3.16 ±1.03. 
A similar response was noted in statement 19, which 
indicated recent pUblicity had been more favorable to 
generic medication and the FDA. Forty-nine respondents 
(37.7%) agreed and 50 (38.5%) were neutral. The overall 
response was neutral at 3.13 ±.88. 
The next statement was positive about generic 
medication, indicating that although irregularities existed 
in the past, generic medications were safe today. The 
responses were evenly distributed between agreeing, neutral 
and disagreeing. The highest response, 54 (41.8%), was 
neutral as was the overall response mean of 3.03 ±.96. 
Next, the investigator wanted to determine whether the 
respondents went to their pharmacists to ask them about the 
pUblicity regarding generic medication. The highest 
response rate came in the neutral category with 59 (47%). 
The remaining respondents were evenly split between agreeing 
and disagreeing, bringing the overall response to a neutral 
2.93 ±1.05. 
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statement 22 was a restatement of question B regarding 
trust in the FDA. If answered in the affirmative, the 
respondent trusted the FDA's ability to regulate the generic 
drug industry. The greatest number of respondents, 51 
(39.5%), were neutral and a few more people agreed than 
disagreed. The overall rate of response, again, was neutral 
at 3.09 ± 1.01. 
The next statement was made in a negative form about 
generic medication. It stated that while the respondent may 
have heard some positive things about the FDA, they still 
felt uneasy about taking generic medication. More people, 
55 (42.9%), agreed with this statement than disagreed, but a 
large number were neutral. This made the overall response 
neutral at 3.23 ± 1.0B. 
statement 24 reexamined the trust people have in their 
pharmacist. If their pharmacist told them a generic 
medication might not be as effective as the brand name, 
would they stick with the brand name? The responses to this 
statement were skewed in favor of the pharmacist. One 
hundred sixteen respondents (B9.1%) would trust their 
pharmacists and purchase the brand name product. The 
overall response was a very positive 4.29 ±.77. 
The final question was a restatement of an earlier one. 
In a positive way it stated the respondent feels more 
confident in generic medication than ever before. Most 
respondents, 60 (45.9%), were neutral on this statement. 
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Those agreeing and disagreeing were evenly distributed, 
which made the overall response rate a neutral, 2.95 + 2.17. 
Spearman Rank Correlation Analysis 
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (r) is used 
with ordered or ranked data to determine the extent to which 
a relationship exists between two variables. In this 
survey, for example, the investigator wanted to determine 
how closely related a respondent's opinion regarding 
generics was to their age, sex, level of income, and level 
of education. In addition, Spearman r's were calculated for 
similar questions to examine the relationship between 
related questions. Overall, the results were statistically 
significant and a Spearman r of 0 to 0.4 would be considered 
either no correlation or a weak one. Values from 0.4 
to 0.6 would be considered a moderate correlation and 0.6 to 
1.0 would be considered a strong one. A negative value 
indicates an inverse correlation (i.e., as people get older 
they would be less likely to know about the generic 
scandal.) 
Table 10 lists the Spearman Rank Correlation 
Coefficients for the demographic information (age, sex, 
level of income, and level of education) and five other 
variables (i) opinion of generic effectiveness, (ii) trust 
in the FDA, (iii) the importance of the pharmacists for 
information on generics, (iv) the amount of money a person 
would need to save to purchase the generic, and (v) 
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Table 10 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 
variables 
statements 
Age Education Income Sex 
Generics are as effective -0.202* -0.0174 -0.0401 -0.093 
as the brand names. 
If gen~rics pass FDA -0.111 0.0051 -0.0468 -0.062 
standards, they must be 
as good. 
My pharmacist is an im- 0.035 -0.035 -0.0313 0.002 
portant source of in-
formation to me about 
generics. 
For me to choose a generic 0.118 
I would need to save 
Have you heard any public- -0.081 
ity about generic drugs 
in the past few years? 
* p < 0.01 
-0.0122 -0.0481 -0.007 
-0.0389 -0.086 -0.072 
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knowledge of pUblicity about generic medications. 
Reviewing the data on age and the four corresponding 
statements, there was only one correlation of significance. 
There was a weak negative correlation (r = -0.202) between 
people's ages and their opinion of the effectiveness of 
generics. This would indicate that the older people get, 
the less likely they would be to trust generics. It must be 
remembered, however, that this is a weak relationship. In 
examining the other demographic variables, sex, level of 
income, and level of education, there were no correlations 
of any significance. 
The most important correlation examined was between the 
statement on the respondents' opinion of generic 
effectiveness and their knowledge of the generic drug 
scandal. If there were a strong negative correlation, that 
is respondents who heard publicity about generics also 
indicated they did not believe they were as effective, it 
could be argued that the drug scandal of 1989 was 
still having an impact on public opinion. In this study, no 
correlation between these two statements could be 
established (r = 0.15, P = 0.014). 
Spearman r values were also calculated for a number of 
other related questions. The data showed that relationships 
could not be established for many of the statements; however 
a few questions had weak correlations. The Spearman rand P 
values are listed for these statements in Table 11. In each 
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Table 11 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients Comparing 
other Questions to the Statement - I Usually 
Ask If a Generic Is Available 
Statements/Variables Spearman r 
In order for me to choose a generic 
I would need to save $ -0.302 
In general, I would NOT buy a 
generic medication for a preventive 
purpose such as birth control pills. -0.287 
In general, I would NOT buy a 
generic medication for a condition 
such as pain, cramping, or coughing. -0.299 
In general, I would NOT buy a 
generic medication for a condition 







case, the responses to the statement, "I usually ask if a 
generic is available" were compared to other questions. 
There was a weak negative correlation between this question 
and the statement, "I would need to save $ ____ in order to 
choose a generic." This indicates that those people who 
usually ask if the generic is available are more likely 
to accept the generic for less money. 
There was also a weak negative correlation between the 
generic availability statement and "I would not accept the 
generic for preventive medications." These data indicate 
that people who ask if a generic is available are more 
likely to accept the generic for preventive drugs. 
The same results were seen when comparing those people 
who ask if a generic is available and those who would not 
choose a generic for a medication which treated the symptoms 
of a cough, pain or cramping. The weak negative correlation 
indicates that the people who ask if a generic is available 
are also more likely to take a medication for symptomatic 
relief. 
The final comparison listed in Table 11 examines the 
results of the statement on generic availability and using 
generic medications for a serious disease such as diabetes, 
hypertension, or cancer. The weak negative correlation 
indicated that people who ask if the generic is available 
are more likely to take the generic product for serious 
diseases. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Demographics 
The respondents to this survey were predominantly 
female with average annual incomes between $15,000 and 
$25,000. The vast majority of respondents were high school 
gradu~tes and many had attended college. The survey was 
answered mainly by working women with incomes in the lower 
average range. 
Knowledge of Generic Drug Scandal of 1989 
The Wolfgang et ale studyl and Gallup Poll survey2 
indicated a fairly high awareness of the generic industry 
scandal of 1989. Not only were people aware of the FDA and 
generic industry problems, there was a generalized decrease 
of faith in both. In contrast to these studies, only 48% 
(132/275) of the respondents were aware of any publicity 
surrounding generics. In addition, only 56 respondents 
(20.3% of total) agreed that the publicity decreased their 
faith in generic medications and fewer people, 45 (16.3% of 
total), had their faith decreased in the FDA. The high 
neutral responses to this statement are most interesting. 
If these respondents were truly aware of the publicity 
surrounding the 1989 generic drug scandal, it would seem 
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unlikely that they would not have an opinion regarding their 
faith in generic medications. It is possible that these 
respondents remembered hearing some news about generics a 
few years ago, but no longer remember what the substance of 
that news was. It is also possible that they heard the 
pUblicity about the scandal, but the impact of that 
information was not sufficient to change their opinion of 
the FDA and generic medications. More study would be 
required to sUbstantiate this information, but the present 
survey' would indicate that many people have forgotten the 
generic drug scandal of 1989 or the impact of the publicity 
surrounding that scandal has been diminished. 
Both the Wolfgang study and Gallup Poll survey 
indicated an increased sensitivity to feelings about generic 
drugs by many people. 1 ,2 It is likely that many pharmacists 
were told "no" when they asked people if they wanted a 
generic instead of the brand name. Some pharmacists could 
have become sensitized over a period of time to the negative 
responses to questioning people about their preference of 
generic or brand name. It is possible that some 
pharmacists have quit asking people if they want a generic 
because of previous negative responses. If this has 
happened, it would appear that pharmacists are being too 
sensitive. According to this survey, 59% of responders 
would accept a generic, if the pharmacist simply asked them. 
Another 23% were neutral, which would indicate some 
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consideration would be given if a generic were offered. 
More study is needed, but indications from the present 
survey would suggest a more open-minded posture toward 
generic medications. This information could be significant 
as many plans encourage the use of generic medications. 
Pharmacists should not hesitate approaching patients about 
using the generic version. This survey indicates that many 
people would accept the idea. 
Opinions of the Pharmacist 
As reported earlier, the pharmacist has enjoyed a 
respected position with the public. 3 The present survey 
supports this premise as 71.9% of respondents (195/272) 
agreed that their pharmacist was an important source of 
information about generic medications. This is further 
supported by the 163 respondents (59.4%) who would accept 
the generic if their pharmacist simply offered it to them. 
The statement that received the greatest positive response 
on the survey was, "I trust my pharmacist and if he/she said 
a generic might not be as effective as the brand name, 
I would stick with the brand name." Eighty-nine percent of 
respondents (116/130) agreed with this statement. The 
present survey reaffirms that people in general trust their 
pharmacist and believe the information the pharmacist 
provides. 
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opinions of Discretionary Generic substitution 
One feature of this survey that was different from 
previous studies was identifying specific categories of 
drugs to determine whether people would accept the generic 
product. Previous surveys treated the generic medication 
question as an absolute. That is, the surveys asked if 
people thought generics were as good as brand name 
medications or if the respondent would accept the generic 
product. The present survey asked about specific drug 
categories to determine if people would accept the generic 
version for some medications, but not others. Indeed, the 
results indicate that some people are less likely to accept 
generics for serious medical conditions such as diabetes, 
hypertension, or cancer. Respondents were also less likely 
to accept the generic for preventive drugs such as oral 
contraceptives. Over twice as many respondents were 
willing to accept generics for medications that give 
symptomatic relief, such as for pain, coughing, or cramping. 
This suggests people are willing to accept the less 
expensive product if the condition is not serious, but are 
less trustful of generics for more serious medical 
situations. 
Another way to examine the generic issue is by cost. 
Some people might say they do not like generics, but would 
accept one if the cost savings was significant. The real 
question is what level of cost savings is significant? To 
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most of the respondents of this survey, the cost savings had 
to be $5.00 or more. This is a significant piece of 
information, because many managed care companies structure 
their copayment programs to encourage generic usage. Many 
programs show a differential of only a few dollars, such as 
$5.00 for brand name and $3.00 for generics. According to 
this survey, this differential is not enough to motivate 
people to use generics. Companies are going to have to show 
wider spreads between brand and generic copayments in order 
to motivate members to use more generic drugs. 
Spearman Correlations 
The Spearman correlation coefficients were moderately 
helpful in reviewing the data. Unfortunately, the 
relationships noted were weak ones and most were not 
statistically significant. It would appear that opinions 
are not strongly associated with a person's level of income 
or education. No correlation could be established 
between gender and generic attitude. There was a weak 
association related to age and generic opinions which was an 
inverse relationship. The survey sample was a fairly young 
group consisting of a large number of people between 20 and 
30 years old. The Spearman coefficient apparently 
represented more people who were skeptical of generics in 
the older age groupings. 
It is also apparent that people who ask for generics 
will accept them for a smaller cost savings. People who 
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responded that they do not usually ask if a generic is 
available were more likely to require a higher cost savings 
in the range of $5.00 or more in order to purchase a 
generic. Also, people who ask if a generic is available are 
more likely to accept one for any type of condition. The 
survey questions were intended to determine if a person's 
opinion of generics was absolute or dependent on the 
specific medication. If patients generally asked if a 
generic was available, they were more likely to accept the 
generic version for all three categories examined. This 
would seem to indicate that people who ask about generic 
availability trust these products irrespective of 
pharmacological class or treatment purpose. 
Limitations of the study 
There were a few limitations to the study that might 
have prevented acquisition of better information. The first 
limitation was that only 32% of the people who were mailed a 
survey actually responded. A second mailing might have 
yielded a higher response rate. 
A second limitation to the study was one additional 
demographic variable that could have been examined. That 
variable is the number of prescriptions the respondent's 
family has filled in a typical year. This question was in 
the original survey, but had to be deleted because of space 
constraints. In retrospect, this variable would have been 
good to study because people who must purchase numerous 
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prescriptions each year might pay closer attention to news 
reports about prescription medication. It would be 
interesting to include this variable in future studies to 
determine if a correlation exists. 
This survey made the statement, "I trust my pharmacist 
and if he/she said a generic medication might not be as 
effective as the brand name, I would stick with the brand 
name." This statement received the highest agreement on the 
survey. In retrospect, it would have been enlightening to 
ask the reverse question, "If my pharmacist told me the 
generic medication would work as effectively as the brand 
name, I would purchase the generic." The data from 
this survey give every indication that the pharmacist has 
tremendous influence with the consumer. However, additional 
research could further sUbstantiate that the pharmacist can 
reassure patients who must take the generic version because 
of their insurance program. 
One further limitation to the study relates to the 
design of the question on the amount of money a respondent 
would need to save to purchase the generic product. The 
choices were $1.00, $2.00, $3.00, $4.00 or $5.00 or more. 
Because the majority of people answered $5.00 or more, it is 
difficult to determine how high the value needed to be in 
order to entice consumers to select a generic. In 
retrospect, this question would have yielded better data had 
it been left open with no choices. 
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Summary 
This survey was initiated to study people's opinions of 
generic medication, review their knowledge of the generic 
drug scandal of 1989, and examine their opinions of their 
pharmacist in relation to generics. The results, which have 
been examined in detail, would indicate a much more positive 
perspective on generic medications than previous studies 
indicated. The trust people have in their pharmacists has 
been reaffirmed as it relates to information and influence 
on generics. As managed care programs give stronger 
incentives for people to use generic medication, it would 
appear many consumers will react positively. In the cases 
where generics are mandated, pharmacists are in a good 
position to give the information and support necessary to 
reassure the patient about these products. 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND COVER LETTER 
scRIpC4RD 
January 25, 1991 
Dear scrip card Member I 
Enclosed you will find a survey Which asks questions aboUt your 
. opinions regarding generic medication and scrip card service. We have 
contracted with Steve Avey at the University of Utah College of 
PhaJt1l8cy to c:onduc:t and analyze this study. Your response is very 
iq)ortant to us and the results will help us formulate policies 
regarcing your prescription drug benefits in the future. 'Ibis infor-
mation may also have national implications as the results vill 'ta 
shared vi th other policy makers around the country. 
'rhe survey results are strictly confidential and your name will 
not be reported in any way that vill identify you. Up in tlMt rigtlt 
hand comer of the. survey you viU notice a number. rus 1II.IIIIber will 
. only be used to identify receipt. of. your survey so that you will nat 
be caltacted in the future and asked. to fill out another one. n.re 
are na right or wrong answers em this survey. we simply want to 1cnoV 
and understand hov you feel about generic mldic:ations and your SCrip 
card services. 
After c::aDpletinq the survey, Which should take only a ff!IV minutes, 
please place it in the envelope provided and drop it in a _il box. 
'n'lere is no postage needed. It is important that we obtain this 
information u SOCI\ as possible. We are askin; that you return the 
survey by March 1, 1991. 
'n'lis information is extremely important to us! We ~~nt to offer 
our members the best possible benefits at the mst econaDical price, 
and our survey vill help us develop programs that best mHt your needs. 
'lbanJc you for taking a few minutes out of your busy sc~ule to help us. 
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A Survev Qf Scrip Card M~mberc:; Rpgarding Generic M~-"!iC3tinn 
Thank you for taking a few minutes to (111 out our survey. The purpose of the survey is to gather 
information regard1ng your opinions about purchasing generic medications. AS you know" 
generic medicat10ns contain the same active ingredient as brand name medications, but they may 
be made by a different company. For example, Tylenol, wh1ch 1s made by McNel1 Labs contains 
Acetaminophen. Since the patent has expired, numerous companies have manufactured Aceta-
minophen tabiets as a generic m~dtcat1on. This survey contains statements whlch you should 
read carefully. Using the code below this paragraph, c1rcle the number which most closely 
represents your feelings about the statement. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. We 
simply want to understand how you feel about purchasing generic medication. 
-I • Strongly Disagree -2· Dtsagree -3'. Neutral -4 &\ Agree -5 * Strongly Agree 
1. My prescr1pt1on card (Scrip Card) is very important to me as a 
health care benef1t. 
2. When I have had to deal with Scrlp Card directly, I have found them to 
be helpful and pleasant. 
J. When I present my Scrip Card to the pharmacist with my prescript1on, 
I am usually greeted w1th a pos1t1ve response. 
SD 0 N A SA 
2 3' 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
4. The type of pharmacy I generally use 1s a _____ (circle one-spec1fy if other) 
Small Independant Chatn Store Other _____ _ 
5. Some insurance companies demand that people purchase generic 
medications when they are available. It is 1mportant to me to be 
able to choose generiCS for myself. 
6. In my op1n1on, gener1c med1cat1ons are as effect1ve as brand name 
med1cat1ons. 
7. I have actually used gener1c med1cat1ons and have been sat1srted with 
the resul ts. 
8. I trust the FDA (Food and Drug Adm1n1stration). If gener1c med1cat1ons 
pass FDA standards, they must be as good as brand name med1cat1ons. 
9. When I get a prescrlpt10n f1l1ed, I usually ask 1f a generic 1s aval1abl:. 
10. My pharmac1st is an important source of 1nformat1on to me regard1ng 
gener1c med1cat1ons. 
11. If the pharmac1st asked me 1f I wanted to buy a gener1c med1cat1on in 
. order to save money, I would do 1t. 
12. In general I would NOT buy a generic med1catton for a cond1t1on such as 
diabetes, h1gh blood pressure, or cancer. 
13. In general I would NOT buy a generic medication for a condit1on such as 
pain. cramping or coughing. 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
2- '3 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '345 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '3 4 5 
2 '345 
cn n II) .\ CA 
14. rn general I would NOT buy a gener1c med1cat1on for a prtvent1ve purpose 
SUCh as b1rth control p111s. 2 J 4.5 
IS. In order for me to choose a gtntr1c I would need to save $ __ _ 
(please c1rcle the number whlCh represents the money you would need to save.> 
1 • S 1.00 2· 52.00 3· 53.00 4· $4.00 S· SS.OO or more 
16. Have you heard of any publicity regarding gtmer1c med1cat10n 1n the cast few 
years? (c1rcJe one) yes no 
IF YOU ANSWERED tIQ. PLEASE SKIP DOWN TO QUESTION 26. IF YOU ANSWERED VJ:'S CONTINUE 
WITH QUESTION 17. 
17. The pubHc1ty I am famlHar wlth, decreased my fa1th in the Food and Drug 
Adnlln1strat10n (FDA). 
18. The publ1!=1ty decreased my faUh In generlc med1catton. 
19. More recent publ1c1ty that I have heard has been favorable to the FDA 
end gener1c medication. 
20. Although certa1n 1rregular1t1es were found a few years ago at the FDA 
and at certatn gener1c manufacttrers. genertcs are as sate tOday as ever. 
21. When I rtrst heard the publtClty about generic medlcat1ons, I asked my 
Pharmacist to explain what was happening. 
22. Today. I teel confident 1n the FDA and trust their abUtty to regulate the 
generiC drUg Inaustry. 
23. Even though I may have heard Postt1ve reports about the FDA. I am sUll 
uneasy about taking generic med1catlons. 
24. I trust my pharmacist and ff helshe sa1d a generic med1cat10n mfght not 
be as ettectlve as the brand name. I would SUck wtth the Drand name. 




















Coyld wa g.t soma 1n'CM'f",tiOO aboyt vou? D1.as. "'lr"". ttl. PlJlrP." ,.., ,."'. ,t ...... ttu,t .... ct 
ctac,..,..1t?f:e YOu 









26. My age category 1s: 1. 21 to 30 2. 31 to 40 3. 41 to 50 4. S I to 60 5. 61 or over 
27. I am a: 1. Female 2. Male 
28. My level of education is; (please c1rcle all that apply) 
1. Attended h19n school 2. Graduated from high SChool 
4. Graduated from college 5~ Attended graduate SChool 
29. The level of fncome ror our faml1y 15: (annual Income) 
1. UP to S 15,000 2. S 15,001 to 525.000 
4. 535.00 I to $45,000 5. S45.00 I to S55.000 
3. Attended college 6. Other _____ _ 
3. S2S.00 1 to $35,000 
6. $55.001 and above 
30. Inclua1ng yourself, how many ctepenaants use your Scrip Card Denef1t? _____ _ 
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